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Foreword: Symposium on Governance
of Public Enterprises
Neil Hamilton*
There is a growing awareness of both the importance of
government enterprise in the American economy and the limited scholarship on this phenomenon in this country. The term
government enterprise includes all production processes providing goods or services that are effectively controlled, directly
or indirectly, by a branch of the government or by a body established by the government to conduct the undertaking in the
public interest.
Throughout this century, federal, state, and local governments in the United States have created a variety of government enterprises in the form of government corporations,
agencies, authorities, departments and districts to produce diverse goods and services. Although the growth in the use of
these entities has been gradual, their cumulative role in the
economy is now substantial. For example, the federal government created seventeen new government corporations or government-sponsored enterprises under varying degrees of
government control in the period from 1960 to 1973. There are
at least six thousand local and regional authorities and one
thousand state and interstate authorities.1
Given the significance of government enterprise in the
economy, policymakers must have an understanding of several
basic questions. The first question relates to why certain types
of firms are government owned or controlled and how such
firms behave. There are also normative questions of how such
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. See A. WALsH, THE PuBIuc's BusINEss: THE PoLITIcs

AND PRACTICES OF

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 6, 353 (1978); Seidman, Government Sponsored Enterprise in the United States, in THE NEW PoLTIcAL ECONOMY: THE PuBUC USE
OF THE PRUVATE SECTOR 85, 106-08 (B. Smith ed. 1975). Pryor has estimated that
employment in publicly owned industries in the United States, excluding public administration and defense, has increased from 5 percent of the labor force
in 1940 to 12 percent of the labor force in 1970. Pryor, Public Ownership: Some
Quantitative Dimensions, in PuBLIc ENTERPRISE: ECONOMC ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 21 (W. Shepherd ed. 1976).
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firns should behave and how to design organizational law applicable to government enterprise so that these enterprises will
achieve their goals.
In contrast to the outpouring of literature on private corporate governance, 2 and the growing literature on governance of
nonprofit corporations,3 government enterprises in the United
States have received little scholarly attention. Surprisingly,
there is no established positive theory to explain why government enterprises came to exist, nor why their numbers have
steadily expanded.4 Similarly, the great diversity of organizational law in government enterprises, even within a single industry such as urban mass transit, suggests that there is no
agreement on the normative issue of the appropriate institutional design for these entities.5
The articles in this Symposium contribute significantly to
filling these lacunae in the scholarly literature. The economist,
De Alessi, writing On the Nature and Consequences of Private
and Public Enterprises,undertakes a review of the positive economic literature attempting to explain why government enterprises exist and how they behave. The two lawyers, Murphy
and Abrams, focus on normative issues of how government enterprise should be governed. Murphy also analyzes the more
specific question of whether the government should produce investment services for public employee retirement systems. A
summary of the most significant points of each article will provide a useful overview of the entire Symposium. Since opportunities for disagreement are abundant in a field with so few
professionally established methodologies with which to test hypotheses and results, this Foreword also discusses a few points
of contention with the respective authors' conclusions.
2. See A.L.L, PaNcIPLEs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTuRE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 13.01-.12 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982); Brudney, The Independent Director-HeavenlyCity or Potemkin Village? 95 HARv.
L. REV. 597 (1982); Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance,the Monitoring Board,and the Director'sDuty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1981); Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and CorporateLaw, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1981).
3. See Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the HospitalIndustry?, 93 HARv.
L. REV. 1416 (1980); Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations,80 MIc.
L. REV. 999 (1982); Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L.J. 835
(1980); Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L REv.
497 (1981).
4. See Rossant, Foreword to A. WALSH, supra note 1, at xi; Hansmann, The
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 896.
5. See N. HAmILTON & P. HAMILTON, GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE:
A CASE STUDY OF UR3AN MASS TRANsrr 11-16 (1981).
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The article by De Alessi undertakes the important work of
summarizing the literature on the positive economics of government enterprise. As De Alessi points out, an analysis of
both the structure of property rights 6 and the implications of
transaction costs resulting in the problem of shirking,7 helps to
structure the inquiry into the reasons for government ownership of certain types of firms and the behavior of such firms.
One persuasive explanation noted by De Alessi for the
existence of government provision of some goods or services
follows from the costs of establishing and enforcing private
property rights. For public goods, which have the characteristics of nonappropriability and nonrivalry in consumption, 8 the
costs of excluding nonpayers may be high enough so that
"some public goods will not be privately produced, or will not
be produced in sufficient quantities, even though consumers
would be willing to pay for them."9 This observation supports
government provision of such goods.
Because, as De Alessi points out, government can contract
with private enterprises for the production of such goods, the
existence of public goods does not fully explain their production by government. More work on this issue is needed.O Of
the explanations proffered by De Alessi, the most intuitively
satisfying is that for some goods the cost of defining and monitoring outputs relative to inputs is very high. Even if contracts
with private enterprise could be drawn for the provision of
these goods, as for example the level of defense, it would be extremely expensive to monitor compliance with contract specifications. Under these conditions, the private enterprise has
substantial opportunities for shirking and opportunistic behav6. For a discussion of the structure of property rights, see De Alessi, On
the Nature and Consequences of Private and Public Enterprises, 67 MnN. L.
REv. 191, 195 (1982).
7. For a definition of transaction costs and shirking, see id. at 193-95.
8. Nonappropriability means that such goods once made available are
equally available to all individuals. Nonrivalry in consumption indicates that
for a given output, additional consumption by one person does not imply reduced consumption for another. A classic public good is the lighthouse,
wherein if one ship receives the benefit of a warning signal, it in no way deprives others from doing so. J. DUE & A. FAIEDLANEi , GOVERNMENT FINANcE:
EcoNOMIcs OF THE PuBuC SECTOR 22 (1977).
9. De Alessi, supra note 6, at 200.
10. Pashigian points out that public production is "somewhat of an embarrassment to economists.... An acceptable theory of public production has
not yet appeared." Pashigian, Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of
Urban Transit Facilities,84 J. PoL. EcoN. 1239, 1239 (1976).
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ior. Government may seek to avoid this by producing the good
itself.
Casual empirical observation of the shift from private to
public ownership in the urban mass transit industry supports
De Alessi's hypothesis. In the 1960's and 1970's, transit subsidies arose to increase the mobility of persons prevented by economic or physical disablement (the transportation
disadvantaged) from moving about the metropolitan area."
These subsidies resulted in part from the altruistic nature of
the public, many of whom did not use mass transit but nevertheless wished to see equity in the distribution of wealth.12
The provision of transit services to the transportation disadvantaged is a public good since it clearly satisfies the preferences
of an additional member of the public without a concomitant
decrease in the consumption of other members of the publici.e., there is both nonappropriability and nonrivalry in
consumption.
It is difficult and costly to define and monitor outputs that
will satisfy these altruistic preferences.13 A survey of transit
systems observed severe shortcomings in the definition of policy and in the supervision of management.14 Without policy
guidelines or supervision of management, the decisions of a
private enterprise regarding the allocation of transit subsidies
would be almost unchecked in a monopolistic or oligopolistic
market-the most common forms of the local transit market.
Policymakers are better able to prevent simple diversion of
public funds if such goods are publicly produced. Civil service
systems, requirements for competitive bidding, separate resource constraints for personnel, money and certain classes of
supplies, and budgetary and accounting procedures can be mobilized for this purpose.' 5
De Alessi then turns to the positive task of describing and
predicting how government enterprises behave. The key notion, which Murphy and Abrams assume in their normative
analyses of organizational law, is that "[tihe systems of property rights, or constraints, embedded in alternative organiza11. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 64-65. The discussion
in note 32 on page 65 questions the importance of this wealth redistribution hypothesis offered by De Alessi. See infra text accompanying note 25. De
Alessi's argument is based on Pashigian's study. See supra note 10.
12. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 64-65.
13. Id. at 98-99.
14. Id. at 18, 29, 31.
15. Seidman, supra note 1, at 84.
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tional forms thus determines, through actual or imputed prices,
how the benefits and harms resulting from a decision will be allocated between the decisionmaker and everyone else. The rechoices
sulting cost-reward
structure will
affect
6
systematically."'
It is in the application of this notion that opinion may differ. De Alessi explains that because property rights in the specialized assets of government enterprises are effectively
nontransferable and the options of moving to other jurisdictions or influencing policy as a voter are costly, the owners of
government enterprises see less direct benefit to themselves
from efforts to monitor managers than do the owners of private
enterprises. Thus, De Alessi hypothesizes that decisionmakers
within government enterprises "will have weaker constraints
on their choices than the managers of regulated comparable
private enterprises."'17 This follows because the latter are subject to the discipline of the market while the former are "less
constrained by market considerations."' 8
There are several problems with this reasoning. In some
markets where government enterprise exists, such as local
transit, the relationship of minimum optimal scale of a firm to
the size of the market may call for monopoly or duopoly.19
Under such conditions, what is the "discipline of the market"?
In addition, as discussed earlier, if government is unable to define policy or to supervise effectively a private enterprise, then
the private enterprise will use all possible opportunistic behaviors to maximize profits in ways that may be totally unrelated
to the public good. The bureaucratic constraints of government
enterprise, however, may check this possibility.
Evaluating the studies of the economic consequences of
government enterprise, De Alessi concludes that there is a
good deal of evidence that government "enterprises typically
will incur higher production costs and will be less efficient by
market standards." 20 All of these studies, however, are seriously flawed. De Alessi points out earlier in his article that alternative organizational forms will have a significant impact on
the choices of decisionmakers. 2 1 It follows that unless the institutional structure of the government enterprise is first speci16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

De Alessi, supra note 6, at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 205-06.
N. HAMITON & P. HAMmITON, supra note 5, at 67.
De Alessi, supra note 6, at 207.
Id. at 204
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fled, comparisons between private and government enterprises
are not meaningful. Unlike private enterprise, which has
adopted a relatively standard company model of corporate governance even in regulated industries, government enterprise
demonstrates a tremendous variety of organizational law, even
within an industry.22
The studies that De Alessi cites do not distinguish among
types of government enterprise, some of which may be more efficient than others. Schmalensee is on firmer ground in concluding that the studies "provide some evidence consistent
with the hypothesis of greater managerial discretion under
public ownership," but, at least in the electric utility industry,
"the literature does not support assertions of dramatic efficiency differences between municipally owned and private
electric utilities."23
Both the Murphy and Abrams articles assume the importance of the incentives and constraints embedded in organizational law posited by De Alessi,24 and seek to analyze how

organizational law of government enterprises should be
designed. Murphy's article, Regulating PublicEmployee Retirement Systems for Portfolio Efficiency, applies the positive theory of how government enterprises in fact behave in analyzing
how organizational law for public employee retirement systems
should be designed. A key contribution of the Murphy article
is the assertion that we must first ask what is the good to be
produced by public employee retirement systems, or, equivalently, what is their purpose, in order to design organizational
law that will best achieve the goal. This is the same problem
that Hansmann identifies in the literature concerning nonprofit
corporations. As Hansmann notes, "Much of the confusion in
this area evidently originates from the lack of any coherent
conception of the basic purposes served by the nonprofit form
of organization." 25
Murphy concludes that the principal product provided by
public employee retirement systems should be, "within an appropriate risk level, the maximization of return on investments
in order that the fund might realize the financial purposes of
the pension system." 26 Murphy refers to this as portfolio selec22. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 11-16.
23. R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 94-95 (1979).
24. De Alessi, supra note 6, at 202.
25. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, supra note 3, at 500.
26. Murphy, Regulating Public Employee Retirement Systems for Portfolio
Effciency, 67 MINN. L. REv. 211, 215 (1982).

1982]

FOREWORD

27
tion efficiency.
The reasoning underlying this conclusion emphasizes the
themes developed in the positive economic theories discussed
by De Alessi. Attacking social welfare improvement as a control objective of pension investment, Murphy argues that, even
if the social welfare investment is financially comparable to alternative investments, there are major problems both in defining social goals for a public employee pension fund and in
implementing them through some system of weights to make
the pursuit of inconsistent social goals operational. It is too
costly to collect the data needed to identify investments that
satisfy established financial and social criteria and needed to
evaluate management performance to make social welfare improvement a feasible control objective of pension fund
28
investment.
Similar reasoning applies to collateral return investment.
The investment manager "must determine what collateral benefits derive from various investments and trace these benefits
to individual plan participants of the particular pension fund.
In addition, the fund manager needs a system for quantifying
collateral benefits [to determine] the values each plan participant places on the collateral benefits, and [to reconcile] the dif-

ferences

among values." 2 9

Murphy concludes

that the

transaction costs of making, reviewing, and modifying such determinations for both social welfare investment and collateral
benefit investment are administratively prohibitive. 30
In essence, Murphy is applying the general predictions that
De Alessi made about government enterprise behavior to this
specific industry. Because it is more difficult to define and supervise the execution of goals, shirking and opportunistic behavior in De Alessi's terms increase. Murphy should have
pointed out that the avoidance of these losses through the
adoption of the portfolio efficiency objective must be weighed
against the gains, if any, from the alternative investment objectives. For example, the broader purposes of social welfare improvement investment or collateral benefit investment may
comport more closely with the preferences of at least some
benefit recipients and taxpayers. Murphy should have been
27. Id.
28. See id. at 224-26.
29. Id. at 222.
30. Id.
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more cautious in her conclusions given the weak empirical evidence cited on these issues.
Murphy then undertakes to outline the organizational law
that will encourage the parties in fund management to strive
for and achieve protfolio efficiency. 31 This is a difficult task
given the state of the positive theoretical literature, but Murphy offers sensible suggestions for improving governance of the
funds. Particularly meritorious is the suggestion to use multi32
ple funds managed by private investment management firms,
which introduces competitive pressures toward lowest cost
production.
The simplification of purpose leads Murphy to suggest that
public production of investment management services may not
be necessary. With a well defined purpose, problems of contract formation and performance evaluation are sufficiently
manageable so that production of the service can be entrusted
to private enterprise without unreasonable shirking or opportunistic behavior. This conclusion is consistent with De Alessi's
discussion of the predictions of the positive theory.
With clearly defined portfolio efficiency objectives to be
met by private investment management firms, Murphy may err
in calling for too much review by the investment board. Are
"periodic face to face meetings" 33 necessary? Would it not be
sufficient to have only one review at the end of a contract unless performance measures reveal a serious problem? Similarly, the call for "a thorough evaluation of management
performance"3 4 implies the possibility of the board remaking
management decisions in the review. It is virtually impossible
to reconstruct accurately the economic conditions at the time a
decision was made. This sort of review will lead to interference
in management and introduce the possibility of the board and
management denying responsibility by blaming each other.
During the contract period, unless a serious problem arises, it
should be sufficient for the board occasionally to check the process of management decisionmaking on an issue to determine,
if it is within a zone of reasonableness.
The article by Abrams, The Power Issue in Public Sector
Grievance Arbitration, focuses on grievance arbitration systems in the public sector. Since many government enterprises
31. Id. at 237-58.
32. Id. at 247.
33. Id. at 249.
34. Id. at 250.
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such as investment management and mass transit are labor intensive, labor relations and labor costs are of major concern. In
mass transit for example, wages and fringe benefits represent
35
70 to 80 percent of all operating costs.

Abrams undertakes a normative analysis of how arbitrators
should approach the issue of the authority and capacity of the
public sector arbitrator. He refers to this as the "power"
36
issue.
Abrams seeks initially to explain the high incidence of the
power issue in public sector grievance arbitration. He concludes that the principal explanation for the prevalence of management attacks on the capacity of the public sector arbitral
institution is simply that the employer is "an elected governmental body, rather than a private entrepreneur."3 7 Because
the employer is a governmental body, Abrams reasons that
public sector collective bargaining is essentially a political process. 3 8 In this process, public officials must adequately accom-

modate the political demands of taxpayers and public service
users and providers at the risk of not being reelected.3 9
On the other hand, Abrams notes that labor arbitration
decisionmaking is an adjudicative process based on established
principles of contract interpretation, not an accommodation of
political interests. 40 Abrams concludes that while the resolution of grievance disputes does have an unavoidable political
impact, the adjudicatory practices of arbitration render the arbitrator incapable of assessing the political implications of his
or her actions.4 1 The implication, later developed more fully, is
that this may be a serious weakness in public sector
arbitration. 42
To address these political issues, Abrams cautions arbitrators against assuming any direct political role in resolving disputes.4 3 He argues that public sector arbitrators can preserve
the neutrality of grievance arbitration while recognizing that
the collective bargaining agreement was negotiated, and that
35. PuBLiC TECHNOLOGY, INC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRANSIT PERFORMANCE 35 (1978).

36. Abrams, The Power Issue in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 67
M.INN. L. REv. 261, 262 (1982).
37. Id. at 272-73.
38. Id. at 282.
39. See id. at 282-83.
40. Id. at 283.
41. Id. at 282-83.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 282-83.
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the arbitrators must operate within a distinctive political context.44 Thus, principles of grievance arbitration developed in
the private sector must not be "imported wholesale," but rather
must be tailored to the distinctive context of the public
45
sector.
A key insight by Abrams is the observation that those in
charge of governmental bodies will seek to maximize votes
among constituent groups rather than simply to pursue lowest
cost production. Trebilcock and Hartle provide additional support for Abrams' thesis, pointing out that "both the determination of policy objectives ... and the means by which those
objectives are to be pursued, will be weighed against the
calculus of how they serve the end of enhancing the prospects
of election ... by the political decision makers. Technical efficiency, per se, will not be a relevant criterion of interest choice;
only if in some way it advances this end of politicians will it
enter the calculus of decision." 46
There is room for disagreement on what this observation
implies about labor arbitration. Because an arbitrator's decision in thepublic sector involves both vote maximizing politicians and an impact on governmental resources, the issue is
whether grievance resolution in the public sector necessarily
has a political facet, and whether this facet must be accounted
47
for in arbitration.
The article by De Alessi provides a useful framework for
addressing this issue. The initial question for a government enterprise is whether the government should provide the good or
service. Whether to subsidize its provision is a political decision made by public officials. The actual production of the good
or service involves essentially economic, not political, decisions.48 Production of the good or service at the lowest cost
will best serve the public. That vote maximizing public officials
may demonstrate opportunistic behavior because of the pub44. Id. at 283.
45. Id.
46. Trebilcock & Hartle, The Choice of Governing Instrumen4 2 INT'L REV.
LAW AND ECON. 29, 33 (1982).
47. See Abrams, supra note 36, at 274-77.
48. The mere fact of public production does not make every decision regarding it a political decision as implied by Abrams. See id. at 277-78. But see
id. at 276 n.62. Simply because all labor decisions involving both private and
public producers have a wider impact than only on the employer or on an employee does not make every labor decision a political decision. This politicization of what are essentially production decisions is a key problem leading to
higher costs in mass transit. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at
24-25, 109-111.
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lic's lack of information on lowest cost production argues for
structural mechanisms that minimize such opportunities and
encourage lowest cost production. From this point of view, the
public sector arbitrator should refrain from introducing political considerations except insofar as necessary to derive the economic result of lowest cost production. It is not the public
provision or production of a good or service per se or the impact on public resources that introduces the political considerations, but rather the constraints introduced by political
realities.

